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Abstract
We present analytic and numerical results for two models, namely the mi-
nority model and the bar-attendance model, which offer simple paradigms
for a competitive marketplace. Both models feature heterogeneous agents
with bounded rationality who act using inductive reasoning. We find that
the effects of crowding are crucial to the understanding of the macroscopic
fluctuations, or ‘volatility’, in the resulting dynamics of these systems.
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1. Introduction
There is much attention now being paid in various disciplines to the topic of complex
adaptive systems [1–4]. In an economics context, such systems may provide invaluable
insight since they can avoid the standard economic assumptions of equilibrium based on ra-
tional behaviour by agents. It is now recognised among economists that realistic models of
economic markets should include the effects of heterogeneous agents with bounded rational-
ity acting via inductive reasoning. In finance theory, a central problem is to understand the
microscopic factors which give rise to macroscopic fluctuations, or ‘volatility’, in financial
markets. It would be fascinating if complex adaptive systems could be used to explain such
global market properties.
Here we present analytic and numerical results for two models which offer simple
paradigms for a competitive marketplace containing competing agents. We show that the
effects of crowding are crucial for understanding the macroscopic fluctuations in the resulting
dynamics of these systems. For the minority model, introduced by Zhang and co-workers
[5,6], we find that an analytic model incorporating ‘crowd’ and ‘anticrowd’ effects can ex-
plain the numerically-obtained volatility over a wide range of parameter space. For the
bar-attendance model, introduced by Arthur [7], we also find that crowd effects are essential
for understanding the volatility.
2. Minority Model
The minority model was introduced by Challet and Zhang [5] and was also discussed by
Savit et al. [6] and de Cara et al [8]. The basic model takes the form of a repeated game as
follows. Consider an odd number of agents N who must choose whether to be in room ‘0’ or
room ‘1’. After every agent has independently chosen a room, the winners are those in the
minority room, i.e., the room with fewer agents. The ‘output’ is a single binary digit for each
time-step: 0 represents room 0 winning, 1 represents room 1 winning. This output is made
available to all agents, and is the only information they can use to decide which room to
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choose in subsequent time-steps. Given that the agents are of limited yet similar capabilities,
we assign to each agent a ‘brain-size’ m; this is the length of the past history bit-string that
an agent can use when making its next decision. Consider m = 2; the possible m = 2 history
bit-strings are 00, 01, 10, 11. When faced with any one of these 2m = 4 histories, the agent
can make one of two decisions, 0 or 1. Hence, there are 22
m
= 16 possible strategies which
define the decisions in response to all possible m = 2 history bit-strings. Each strategy can
thus be represented by a string of 4 bits [ijkℓ] with i, j, k, ℓ = 0 or 1 corresponding to the
decisions based on the histories 00, 01, 10, 11, respectively. For example, strategy [0000]
corresponds to deciding to pick room 0 irrespective of the m = 2 history bit-string. [1111]
corresponds to deciding to pick room 1 irrespective of the m = 2 history bit-string. [1010]
corresponds to deciding to pick room 1 given the histories 00 or 10, and pick room 0 given
the histories 01 or 11. The agents randomly pick s strategies at the beginning of the game.
After each turn of the game, the agent assigns one (virtual) point to each of his strategies
which would have predicted the correct outcome. In addition the agent gets awarded one
(real) point if he is successful. At each turn of the game, the agent uses whichever is the
most successful strategy among the s strategies in his possession, i.e., he chooses the one
that has gained most (virtual) points.
The important feature of both the minority model, and the bar-attendance model de-
scribed later, is that the success of any particular strategy is generally short-lived. If all
the agents begin to use similar strategies, and hence choose the same room, such a strategy
ceases to be profitable and is hence dropped. Hence there is no best strategy for predicting
the market for all times. References [5] and [6] provide various numerical results for the
minority model. The main result which emerges from the numerical simulations [5,6] of
the minority model concerns the volatility (i.e., standard deviation) of the time-series x(t)
corresponding to the number of agents attending a given room, say room 0, at each time
step, with each time step taken to be a turn in the game. When the number of strategies
per agent s is small, the volatility σ exhibits a pronounced minimum as a function of the
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brain-size m. Around this minimum, the volatility σ is substantially smaller than the value
obtained for the case where each agent makes his decision by tossing a coin [5,6]. A complete
analytic theory describing σ as a function of m for arbitrary N and s has, however, been
lacking.
3. Effects of Crowds and Anticrowds
Here we propose an analytic theory which describes the volatility for arbitrary m, N and
s. We first present the basic idea, before proceeding to explicit expressions. Consider the
oversimplified case of N independent agents each deciding whether or not to attend room 0
by tossing a coin. Using standard random-walk results, the total variance σ2 of attendance
in room 0 is given by the sum of the variances produced by the N independent agents:
σ2 =
N∑
i=1
σ2i (1)
where σ2i =
1
2
.(1 − 1
2
) = 1
4
. Hence σ2 = N
4
. However in reality on any given turn of the
minority game, there are a number of agents using the same, or similar, strategies. Consider
the subset of agents ni using a particular strategy i. Although there is no information
available to a given agent about other individual agents nor is any direct communication
allowed between agents, this subset ni will all act in the same way, i.e., they all go to either
room 0 or 1 and hence constitute a crowd. Since the corresponding random-walk ‘step-size’
has become ni, one might think that σ
2
i should be given by
1
4
n2i . Given that there is no
a priori best strategy, however, it is important to realize that there may also be a subset
of agents ni¯ who are using the opposite, or at least very dissimilar, strategies to the first
subset ni. We call this second subgroup the anticrowd, and the strategy i¯ that they use is
anti-correlated to strategy i (e.g. if i is [0000] then i¯ is [1111]) [5]. The anticrowd chooses
the opposite room to the crowd and hence behaves as a crowd itself. Over the timescale
during which the two opposing strategies are being played, the fluctuations of attendance
in room 0 are determined only by the net crowd-size Ni = ni− ni¯. Hence σ2i should instead
be given by 1
4
N2i .
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Suppose strategy i∗ is the highest scoring at a particular moment in the game: the anti-
correlated strategy i¯∗ is therefore the lowest scoring at that same moment. In the limit of
small brain-size m, the size of the strategy space is small. For most values of s, it follows that
even if an agent picks i¯∗ among his s strategies, he will not have to use it since he will most
likely have a high scoring strategy in his toolbag. In practice if m is small, the required s can
be relatively small since a modest value of s is sufficient for each agent to carry a considerable
fraction of all possible strategies. Therefore, many agents will choose to use either i∗ itself (if
they hold it among their s strategies) or a similar one. Very few agents will have such a poor
set of s strategies that they are forced to use a strategy similar to i¯∗. In this regime there
are practically no anticrowds, hence the crowds dominate. Therefore Ni ∼ Nδii∗ yielding
σ2i ∼ N
2
4
δii∗ ; the resulting volatility σ
2 ∼ N2
4
is larger than the independent agent limit of
N
4
and is therefore consistent with the numerical simulations [5,6]. In the opposite limit of
large brain-size m, the strategy space is very large, hence agents will have a low chance of
holding, and hence playing, the same strategy. In addition, even if an agent has s low-scoring
strategies, the probability of his best strategy being strictly anticorrelated to another agent’s
best strategy (hence forming a crowd-anticrowd pair) is small. All the crowds and anticrowds
are of size 0 or 1 implying that the crowds and anticrowds have effectively disappeared and
the agents act independently. We thus have Ni = 0 or 1 with
∑
iNi ∼ N . The volatility
is then given by σ2 ∼ N
4
which is again consistent with the numerical simulations [5,6]. In
the intermediate m region where the numerical minimum exists for small s, the size of the
strategy space is relatively large so that some agents may get stuck with s strategies which
are all low scoring. They can hence form anticrowds. The presence of finite-size anticrowds
implies that
∑
iNi < N . Considering the extreme case where the crowd and anticrowd are
of similar size, we have Ni ∼ 0 and hence σ2i ∼ 0. The volatility is therefore small (σ ∼ 0)
which is again consistent with the numerical results. For a fixed value of m, this regime of
small volatility will arise for small s since in this case the number of strategies available to
each agent is small, hence some of the agents may indeed be forced to use a strategy which
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is little better than the poorly-performing i¯∗. In other words, the cancellation effect of the
crowd and anticrowd becomes most effective in this intermediate region. It is this interplay
between the size of the strategy space and the probabilities of agents forming crowds and
anticrowds which gives rise to the rich and non-trivial behaviour of the volatility.
Analytic expressions for the crowd and anticrowd sizes can be obtained in various ways,
with varying degrees of accuracy. Here we present one such approach, and show that it
yields good quantitative agreement with the numerical results. We need to calculate the
number of agents who are using a given strategy i or one which is similar, such that they
are acting identically in the majority of turns. We can immediately exploit the results of
Ref. [5] concerning the reduced strategy space. In particular, given a strategy i, the only
strategies that are significantly different from i are the anti-correlated strategy i¯∗ plus the
uncorrelated strategies [5]. For example for m = 2, given a strategy i ≡ [0000] the strategies
which will yield significantly different actions from i are i¯ ≡ [1111], plus the uncorrelated
strategies [1100], [1010], [1001], [0110], [0101], [0011]. Although the full strategy space
contains 22
m
= 16 strategies, the reduced strategy space only contains 2 ·2m = 8. Henceforth
we only need to consider the reduced strategy space – in agreement with Ref. [5], we have
found that the numerical results for the volatility are quantitatively very similar for both
the full strategy space and the reduced strategy space [5].
The number of strategies in the reduced strategy space Vm is given by a = 2·2m. For s = 1
strategy per agent, the probability that a given strategy in Vm will be picked by a given agent
at the start of the game is 1
a
. Consider a given moment in the game. We can rank all the
strategies as best, 2nd best, 3rd best, etc at that moment. Since agents will always play their
best strategy, the probability that the current best strategy is being used by a given agent is
given by the probability that the agent actually has this strategy. Similarly, the probability
that the 2nd best strategy is being used by a given agent is equal to the probability that
the agent has this strategy but does not possess the best strategy. Since repetition of picked
strategies is allowed during the initial picking process, it is straightforward to show that for
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general s the mean number of agents yr using the r-th best strategy is given by
yr = N
([
1− (r − 1)
a
]s
−
[
1− r
a
]s)
. (2)
Notice that
∑r=a
r=1 yr = N as required.
Next we consider the probability P that given a particular strategy is being used, then its
anticorrelated strategy is also being used. Consider the list of all 2 · 2m strategies in order of
the number of virtual points they have collected. The i-th strategy and the [2 ·2m+1− i]-th
strategy will be anticorrelated. For large values ofm and hence large reduced strategy space,
P will be negligible since it is highly unlikely that if a strategy is used then its anticorrelated
strategy is also used. It is only when the total number of strategies in play, which is of order
N , greatly exceeds the number of strategies in the reduced strategy space that P will be of
order unity. We can thus approximate P by P (p) = p for p < 1 and P (p) = 1 for p > 1,
where p = N/(2 · 2m). Although the form for P (p) can be made more accurate, the present
expression is reasonable since there are only of order N strategies out of a possible maximum
of 2 · 2m which can actually be in play at any one time. Hence, as expected, P (p) is zero
when N << 2 · 2m and unity when N >> 2 · 2m. We have checked that our analytic results
for the volatility are fairly insensitive to the precise form of P (p) as long as P (p) satisifes
the constraints P (0) = 0 and P (p >> 1) = 1.
Equation (2) gives yr in terms of m, s, and N . In satisfying
∑r=a
r=1 yr = N , we should in
practice take into account the fact that agents exist only as integer values. Hence we should
only include R terms in this sum, subject to the condition that the partial sum equals N
after the quantities yr have been rounded to the nearest integer. In addition we choose to
round any yr’s which are less than one, up to one if r ≤ R such that the first R terms are
all non-zero. There are hence only R different strategies in play; note that R ≤ 2 · 2m and
R ≤ N . The probability P (p) is, to a reasonable approximation, the probability that the
[R + 1 − r]-th strategy is anticorrelated to the r-th strategy. The variance can hence be
written analytically as
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σ2an =
1
4
r= 1
2
(R−g)∑
r=1
[yr − P (p)yR+1−r]2 +
1
4
r= 1
2
(R−g)∑
r=1
[(1− P (p))yR+1−r]2 +
g
4
[yR+1
2
]2 (3)
where g = 0 if R is even and g = 1 if R is odd. The first term represents the net effect
after pairing off the agents playing anticorrelated strategies. The second term in Eq. (3)
reintroduces those agents using strategies that were assumed to be anticorrelated to some
more successful strategy, and hence were discarded unnecessarily in the first term. The third
term in Eq. (3) is due to the volatility of the group which remains unpaired in the case
where the number of different strategies used in the calculation is odd. The third term is
usually neglibible compared to the first two.
Figure 1 shows the volatility for s = 2, s = 4 and s = 6 with N = 101 agents, as
calculated using the analytic results above. Note that since m is integer, the curves are not
smooth. Figure 2 compares these theoretical volatility curves (solid lines) with the numerical
simulations (dashed line). The agreement between the analytic and numerical results is
good across a wide range of m and s values. In particular, the analytic results capture the
deepening of the minimum in the volatility as s decreases. For the range of s considered, the
crowds are much larger than the anticrowds for smallm (i.e., below the minimum). Hence the
volatility is large for small m. As m increases, the crowds and anticrowds begin to compete
effectively for small s, hence yielding the minimum as discussed qualitatively earlier in the
paper. This minimum disappears with increasing s since the anticrowds become negligible
in size; this is reasonable since for large s the likelihood of being stuck with a strategy which
is essentially anti-correlated to a winning strategy is very small. The agent with such a
strategy would typically have several better choices among his s strategies. For large m
(i.e., above the minimum) the crowds and anticrowds have reduced in size to such a point
that the agents act independently. The agreement in Fig. 2 can be improved upon by
using a better approximation for P (p) at the expense of increased analytic complexity. We
note that the above arguments also explain the behaviour of the volatility at fixed, small m
shown in Fig. 1: the volatility increases with s due to the decreasing likelihood of forming
substantial anticrowds.
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It is interesting to note that the present analytic approach uses an idea which is very
common in condensed matter physics: the population of N agents is treated in terms of
clusters. These clusters are chosen such that the dominant correlations in the problem
become intra-cluster correlations, i.e., we choose a given cluster i to contain the ni agents
using strategy i and the ni¯ agents using strategy i¯. The strong intra-cluster correlations
between the crowd ni and anticrowd ni¯ are treated as accurately as possible, and dominate
the weak inter-cluster correlations which can themselves be effectively ignored.
Finally we note that we have also found a new scaling result for the minority model for
arbitrary N , m and s, which goes beyond that reported in Ref. [6]. In particular, if we plot
the numerical values of the reduced variable σ/
√
N as a function of (2 · 2m)/(Ns), then the
data undergo almost complete data collapse [10]. This collapse becomes increasingly precise
for larger s (e.g. s ≥ 4).
4. Bar-Attendance Model
Arthur [7] proposed the ‘bar-attendance’ model in which N adaptive agents, each pos-
sessing s prediction rules or ‘predictors’ chosen randomly from a pool of V , attempt to
attend a bar, whose cut-off is L, on a particular night each week. Each week the agents
update their best rule for predicting a given week’s attendance based on the past attendance
time-series x(t), which is made known to all agents. As stated in Ref. [5], the minority model
seems to be a special case of the bar-attendance model. There are differences however: the
output is no longer binary, nor do we restrict all predictors to depend on the same number
of past weeks’ data. The predictors in our pool of V are chosen from a variety of ‘classes’ of
rules. For example, one class might comprise rules which take an arithmetic, geometric, or
weighted average over the past m weeks’ attendances; another class might copy the result
from week m′; or alternatively, might take the mirror image of x(t) about L from week m′′.
In Ref. [9], we presented the results of numerical simulations on the bar-attendance model
and showed that the volatility of the attendance time-series can exhibit a minimum at small,
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but finite, s. Here we are interested in the extent to which crowding effects can explain the
dynamics.
Figure 3 shows a plot of the volatility (i.e., standard deviation) σ as a function of the
number of agents N for a predictor pool size V = 60. When the number of agents is
smaller than the cut-off value (i.e. N < L), the volatility σ ≈ 0 as expected. When the
number of agents is larger than the cut-off value (i.e. N > L), the volatility increases with
increasing N [9]. As for the minority model above, suppose that each agent decides whether
to attend based on a pre-assigned probability. Given the common knowledge of the cut-off
L, each agent should attend with a probability L
N
and stay away with a probability 1 − L
N
.
The volatility can be estimated using the expression for a bounded random walk, i.e., the
volatility σ ∼
√
N · L
N
· (1− L
N
) which gives
√
L(1− L
N
). The dashed line in Fig. 3 shows
that this is however a poor approximation to the numerical results. The discrepencies imply
that we should include correlations between the actions of the N agents. In particular several
agents may be using the same predictor at any one time. Hence, crowd effects will again be
important. A crowd model can be developed in a way analogous to that for the minority
model. However the model will necessarily be less sophisticated than in Sec. 3 since the
‘predictor-space’ in the bar-attendance problem is less easily described than the strategy
space for the (binary) minority model.
Consider the most popular predictor in use at a given stage of the simulation. There
will be approximately n1 = N
s
V
agents using this predictor. We denote these n1 agents as
belonging to group 1. All n1 agents in group 1 will make the same decision as whether to
attend in the subsequent week. Note that in the case that agents, when initially picking
predictors from the pool V , are prohibited from picking the same predictor twice, this
expression n1 = N
s
V
is quite accurate in practice. When agents are allowed to pick the
same rule repeatedly, the expression s
V
is merely an estimate of n1. In what follows, we
will disallow repeated-picking of predictors. It is straightforward to show that the r-th most
popular predictor will be used by approximately
10
nr = N
s
V
[
1− s
V
]r−1
(4)
agents. These agents belonging to group r form a crowd and will all make the same de-
cision as to whether to attend in the subsequent week. As with the minority model, the
resulting volatility-squared σ2 is given by the sum over the volatilities-squared σ2r produced
by each group, i.e., σ2 =
∑
r σ
2
r . Now σ
2
r ∼ n2r LN (1 − LN ), hence σ can be calculated by
obtaining nr from Eq. (4) above. Note that nr is again rounded to the nearest integer due
to the discreteness of agent-number. Figure 3 compares the volatility σ obtained using this
crowd model (dotted line) to the numerical simulation (solid line). The analytic model is
in good quantitative agreement with the simulation results, in stark contrast to the earlier
random walk model without crowding (dashed line). Future work will investigate the role
of anticrowds in the bar attendance model.
5. Summary
In summary we have presented an analytic analysis of crowding effects in the minority
and bar-attendance models. We hope that the present results will stimulate further interest
in what is proving to be an exciting field of study for physicists.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Analytic results for the minority model volatility (i.e., standard deviation) σ for
s = 2, s = 4 and s = 6 strategies per agent. Number of agents N = 101. Since m can
strictly only take integer values, the curves are not smooth.
Figure 2: Comparison between analytic and numerical results for the minority model volatil-
ity (i.e., standard deviation) σ. Results are shown for (a) s = 2, (b) s = 4 and (c) s = 6,
where s is the number of strategies per agent. Number of agents N = 101. Solid line:
analytic result (see text). Dashed line: numerical simulations. Since m is integer, the curves
are not smooth.
Figure 3: Bar-attendance model volatility (i.e. standard deviation) σ as a function of the
number of agents N . The number of predictors per agent s = 3, the bar cut-off value L = 60
and the predictor pool size V = 60. Solid line: numerical simulation results. Dashed line:
random walk model without crowding (see text). Dotted line: analytic crowd model (see
text).
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